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1. The early years
The Prebisch that most people remember nowadays was
a distinguished figure in international circles, with only
sporadic interventions (1955 and 1984) in the economic
affairs of Argentina, but this Prebisch who lived outside
Argentina in the second half of the twentieth century
played an extremely important role when he was a
young man in the design and implementation of policies
that brought about notable changes in that country.
He had graduated from the Faculty of Economic
Sciences in 1923, and twenty years later, when he was
still only 42 years old, he was forced to put an end to
his work as General Manager of the Central Bank of
the Argentine Republic, after eight years in that post
and after having occupied high posts in the government.
When he was still a student he translated the study
that J.H. Williams presented at the seminars of the
school.1 That work, and through it Taussig’s ideas on
economic cycles and balance of payments adjustments
with capital movements, gave him the idea of analysing
the Argentine cycles and mechanisms not envisaged in
current international trade theory.
In 1922 Alejandro Bunge put forward his name to
occupy the post of Director of Statistics of the Sociedad
Rural Argentina. There he headed a team which in 1928
published a yearbook with the fullest historico-
statistical information on the country to date.
In that same year he was entrusted with the
organization of an economic research department in
the Banco de la Nación Argentina, where he was to
carry out important work on the compilation of statistics
and short-term economic analysis, published in the
Bank’s Revista económica (BNA, 1928).
When Argentina was faced with new problems in
the 1930s, the theoretical and statistical knowledge thus
acquired allowed him to meet a challenge to which few
intellectuals of that country have been able to respond.
The circumstances he had to live in: the end of one
world, that of the belle époque, and the appearance of
a new one, that of closed economies and nationalist
reactions, were hard for anyone to understand.
It was necessary to adapt or construct theories to
explain phenomena which were previously unknown
and hence had never been studied before. His visit to
Australia in the 1920s and his stay in the United States
–including his friendship with Williams– helped him
in this task and allowed him to keep abreast of the
newest intellectual developments.
Under the influence of Williams’ study on balance
of payments adjustment mechanisms in a country with
inconvertible paper money and the theories on
economic cycles (Taussig, 1915; Hawtrey, 1919;
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Kondratieff, 1946), he began to work out new
interpretations on the characteristics of the Argentine
cycle. Argentina had an economy which depended on
its exports of cereals, and this gave it a seasonal nature
and also made it very vulnerable, since it was affected
both by weather conditions and by the big fluctuations
in international markets. There was also a monetary
system which further accentuated such fluctuations. The
seasonal cycle –which had come to be called the
Argentine cycle– meant that when the harvests were
sold in the summer months there was an inflow of gold
and the banks expanded their supply of credit, whereas
in winter, when there were no export proceeds, there
was a shrinkage in national income and the banks
reduced their credit. This gave rise to the idea of taking
counter-cyclical measures.
In 1921, while he was still a student in the school
of Economic Sciences, Prebisch published his “Notas
para la historia monetaria de la Argentina” (Prebisch,
1921), in which he went back all the way to colonial
monetary antecedents, noting that it was paradoxical
that in a colony producing silver there was a shortage
of currency. It was not that there was a shortage of silver,
he said, but that as the Mint received currency at a lower
price than it had as a commodity, it hoarded it and only
circulated bad money: the “macuquina”, a feeble
currency which was considered to be of little value
because of its low content of silver, or local substitutes.
In his “Notas” he studied the experience of issuing
banks and inconvertible paper currency, as well as the
crises of 1876, 1885 and 1890, maintaining that they
were the result of over-expansion of credit in the upward
phases of the cycle, in which purchasing power was
created through money issue, whereas this situation was
reversed when a deficit appeared in the balance of
payments and the money supply had to be reduced. In
the last part of the article in question he dealt with the
1913 crisis and began to outline a theory on monetary
disturbances in the phases of cycles with a Currency
Board system: a theory which he later developed in the
Central Bank, in that institution’s Memoria for 1938
(BCRA, 1939). He said in that respect that whereas in
issuing banks the money issue is based on commercial
credit, in a Currency Board system money can only be
issued on the basis of the balance of payments surplus
(gold reserves). He noted however that even under the
latter system inflows of gold produce not only an
increase in the money supply but also an increase in
the reserves of the banks, which, because they have
more reserves, likewise expand credit. Hence, in an
upward phase of the cycle there is over-expansion of
credit (a procyclical tendency), whereas when the
opposite takes place there is an outflow of gold, the
reserves go down, and credit shrinks still further. This
is what happened in the upward phase of the cycle in
1913, he said, causing a chain reaction and giving rise
to generalized pessimism on the economic outlook
which made the recession still worse through its effects
on consumption and investment.
2. His years in government and in the Central Bank
The 1930s was a period of enormous difficulties, but
also of new experiences in the formulation and
implementation of economic policies, under the new
roles taken on by the government.
The 1930 world crisis made it necessary for
Argentina to place itself in a totally different
international context and find answers to situations
which were previously unknown.
In 1933 Prebisch had read the four articles by
Keynes published in The Times, after which, he said, “I
began to think about an expansionary policy”.2 Later
on, he was to play a leading part in disseminating
Keynes’s ideas in Spanish (Prebisch, 1947).
After the enormous upsets in the international
goods and capital markets during the period following
the First World War, the rigidity of the Gold Standard
had become obvious. Argentina had been one of the
few countries which, following the lead of Great Britain,
had returned to a Currency Board system in 1927, at
the parity which had prevailed before the war. It may
be noted that during the time that that system had been
closed down, currency issue had continued under the
rules of the Gold Standard. In 1914 a law had been
adopted permitting the issue of money on the basis of
the discounting of paper of the Banco de la Nación
Argentina, provided that 40% of the reserves were kept
in gold. This law had not been used, however. In 1929,
after the collapse of the New York Stock Exchange,
and fearing a run on the banks, the government decided
to close down the Currency Board, but it did not prevent
remittances abroad and, after the first devaluation, it
tried to maintain an overvalued exchange rate for the
peso by selling gold. After the 1930 revolution, and
finding itself in a difficult situation because the outflow
of gold to pay debts and imports continued and delays
were building up in the delivery of foreign exchange,
it decided –in line with the 1914 law– that the Currency
Board would issue money on the basis of paper
2
 Quoted in Fernández López, 1996.
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discounted by the Banco de la Nación Argentina. As
Prebisch (who had been Under-Secretary of Finance
up to 1932) noted, that measure did not yet represent a
change from the orthodox policy with which the
government aimed to face the crisis (i.e., reducing
expenditure and increasing taxes), but was taken
because it was urgently necessary to replenish the assets
of the banking system, which had been exhausted with
the outflow of gold. At all events, however, the Gold
Standard system was made more flexible. Taxes were
established on remittances and government expenditure
was reduced by lowering the wages of public
employees. Rather than because of the closing down
of the Currency Board and the application of the 1914
law, 1932 was important because it was then that money
was issued on the basis of public securities in order to
finance the Treasury deficit and a new conception of
the monetary system came into being.
In 1933, with the entry of Pinedo into the Cabinet
as Minister of Finance and the return of Prebisch as
Under-Secretary, measures were applied which formed
part of a plan guided by a new conception of economic
policy. At the request of ministers Pinedo and Duhau,
certain economic measures were formulated which
were reflected in the National Economic Plan of Action
of November 1933.
In that year the peso was devalued, not only in order
to balance the balance of payments but also in order to
support the agricultural sector. There was, said Prebisch,
a true redistribution of profits; it was not just a mere
exchange rate measure but was combined with the
purchase of the harvest surpluses which it had not been
possible to sell, in order to give the population greater
purchasing power. It also aimed to stimulate economic
activity through public works programmes and aid for
industry.
Exchange controls were also established, with two
markets: one official, on which the foreign exchange
corresponding to the official prices of regular exports was
sold, and the other a free market on which the excess over
the official prices and the income from non-traditional
exports to neighbouring countries could be changed. Two
exchange rates were established: a buying rate at 15 pesos
per pound sterling, and a selling rate which was finally set
at 17 pesos. Since at these rates the demand for foreign
exchange was greater than the supply, foreign exchange
was rationed through prior import licences granted
according to criteria fixed by the government. As Prebisch
said: “Now, for the first time, we are putting into effect a
monetary and financial plan which is above the old
traditional influences” (BCRA, 1986, p. 50).
It was the understanding of everyone that these
measures were of an extraordinary nature, as were the
situations they sought to correct, and that when the
Central Bank was set up in 1935 and exchange controls
were allowed to continue, there was nevertheless the
intention of getting rid of the latter and returning to a
free market. In the message accompanying the bill
proposing the establishment of the Central Bank –
noted Prebisch– it was clearly stated that the aim was
to establish a bank which would maintain the stability
of the currency and make it possible to return to normal
in monetary matters, but only provided that the main
nations of the world did the same and that international
trade was restored. But “if a system of closed
economies prevails” –added the message– “the
country will have, in its Central Bank, the means for
adapting its policies to this de facto situation, in defence
of the national interests” (BCRA, 1986, p. 51). These
measures were adopted, then, in response to the closure
of the economies of the most highly developed
countries.
3. The Central Bank
Prebisch was a member of the first commission
responsible for drafting a project for a central bank,
but this was rejected in favour of a project by Otto
Niemeyer, who had already prepared a similar project
for Brazil. The 1935 law, however, differed from the
Niemeyer project and incorporated modifications which
bore the stamp of Prebisch.
The creation of the Central Bank was designed to
achieve monetary stability and reduce the disturbances
of the economic cycle. Prebisch maintained that in view
of the characteristics of the cycle in Argentina, the
Central Bank should intervene to smooth out the
fluctuations by using absorption instruments. He
considered that rediscounting, in contrast, would play
only a transitory role.
“Thus, although the Bank was along classical lines
... the actual situation would not allow it to act in that
manner” and “the possibility of applying another type
of policy” should be envisaged. Here, he reiterated the
concepts which he had already put forward in the early
1930s in “La acción de emergencia en el problema
monetario” (Prebisch, 1991, p. 51). He went on to say
“The strict Gold Standard system had an intrinsic flaw:
during the upward phase the banks’ assets grow, and
this leads them to lend more money, because of the
natural competition among them, so that they create
more purchasing power than would be warranted by
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the balance of payments position. This creation of
purchasing power expands the effects of the upward
phase but makes necessary a more violent contraction
in the downward phase. But this is not the case if,
instead of creating money, the compulsory reserves of
the banks are increased during the upward phase, this
extra cash is collected and sterilized so that it cannot
serve to expand credit, and it is then returned when the
situation is reversed, in order to avoid a contraction”
(Ibid., p. 52).
Rediscounting would be used only in limited cases:
when a harvest failed or exports went down and there
was an outflow of hard money. In those circumstances,
rediscounting was in order in order to take pressure off
the economy and prevent a contraction in agricultural
activity and all the other activities connected with it.
The first intervention by the Central Bank took
place from 1935 to mid-1937, in the upward phase,
and involved the creation of absorption certificates
which made it possible to sterilize purchasing power
(saving), as well as buying back part of the external
debt in dollars. When it was observed, in mid-1937,
that the cycle was turning round and a downward phase
was beginning, the reserves were used to give back
purchasing power to the public in order to prevent a
recession from spreading. The idea was to soften the
cyclic curve and this, said Prebisch, was the second
stage in “our monetary ideas”. Up to then, purchasing
power was taken away in the upward phase and returned
in the downward phase, but money was not created.
In the next intervention, during the early years of
the Second World War, the authorities went much
further. In view of the severe contraction in the early
years of the war, when traditional markets disappeared,
it was decided to try to give a more active role to the
policy of regulating the means of payment, by creating
purchasing power in order to promote industry and
construction work; that is to say, it was decided to apply
very active market policies in order to promote the
development of the economy, but within a monetary
circuit controlled through the exchange control system.
This idea had been at the centre of the proposal
made by minister Pinedo in his 1940 economic
reactivation plan (BCRA,1986), which consisted of
mobilizing the enormous amount of idle deposits
invested in the short term in the financial system, so
that through the intervention of the Central Bank
–which would purchase those deposits– the commercial
banks would be able to make long-term loans, primarily
for promoting construction (which was the most
dynamic engine of growth in Prebisch’s view) and local
industry. This would have to be done with extreme
caution, and only as long as there was not full
employment of the factors of production, because
otherwise it would lead to inflation.
These measures –said Prebisch– finally turned out
to be unnecessary, because from 1941 on, with the entry
of the United States into the war, exports increased, the
supply of imports was reduced, and purchasing power
rose within the country. This instrument was, however,
to be used later in very different circumstances with
highly inflationary consequences, which he criticized
in his 1955 report to the Argentine government
(BCRA,1956).
4. Conclusions
In his years in government, Prebisch played a leading
part in the formulation of new ideas and economic
policies which had a profound influence in following
decades. Many of them were put forward in response
to exceptional circumstances, and were to be abandoned
if those circumstances disappeared. In the final analysis,
they were responses to a world in which economies
had closed and there were no international capital
markets.
The starting point for these ideas was the
conviction that the Gold Standard could avoid
monetary crises, but not banking crises, which had
serious consequences for the whole economy because
of the pro-cyclical nature of bank credit. Prebisch
proposed that compulsory reserves should be
increased in the expansion phase and reduced in the
contraction phase, and that a reserve fund should be
established which would withdraw purchasing power
from the public (through absorption certificates) and
return it to them (by buying back those certificates)
in the downward phase, while rediscounting should
be only a transitory measure. In order for that
purchasing power not to be diverted towards imports,
there should be an exchange control system with
selective exchange permits.
Although Prebisch does not actually say this in as
many words, the idea was that counter-cyclical policies
should be applied in the upward phase, when it is
possible to build up reserves, for if it is not possible to
restore purchasing power in the downward phase, this
can only be expanded by creating money, which he does
not recommend as it would produce inflation. All this,
however –and this is an aspect which Prebisch does
not mention because it seems so obvious– requires a
thoroughly solvent and credible State.
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In reality, this is rather similar to smoothing of
taxes. But why use a monetary instrument instead of a
fiscal one, then? In fact, fiscal instruments were not
ruled out, since in the upward phase in 1935-1937
external debt was bought back with part of the surplus,
but apparently it was politically easier to restrict credit
by increasing the reserves in an upward phase than to
increase taxes or reduce expenditure, when this had
already been done earlier in order to balance the budget.
Finally, the last stage in what Prebisch called his
thinking on economic management has to do with the
reactivation plan prepared by minister Pinedo and the
Central Bank policies designed to use the surplus of
short-term deposits for long-term loans in order to
promote construction and industrial activity. The
Central Bank was to take those short-term deposits and
then lend them to the banks on a long-term basis, the
justification for that measure being the upsets caused
by the war in agricultural production, which had no
outlet for its goods, and the need to orient activities
toward the domestic market. The entry of the United
States into the conflict in 1941 changed the situation,
however, as exports of wool and hides to that country
increased, while imports went down, thus balancing the
balance of payments and, in Prebisch’s view, making it
unnecessary to apply the measure.
At all events, however, new policy instruments had
now been created.
After Prebisch had been removed from the Central
Bank, in 1943, that institution made repeated
widespread use of rediscounting, with very adverse
consequences for the economy, as he himself
emphasized in his 1955 report to the Argentine
government (BCRA,1956). By then, after more than a
decade in the government, his economic ideas had
reached maturity, and since that time they have had an
undeniable influence on numerous aspects of the
economic thinking and history of Argentina.
(Original: Spanish)
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